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Abstract
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to instigate intense wars against popular ecommerce and content websites.
One in five companies worldwide become a DDoS attack victim. Such attacks remain active causing prolonged damage from a
few hours to several weeks. Deccan Chronicle34,35, dated April 29, 2015, reported above statement as conclusion of Kaspersky
Lab’s and B2B’s international survey with categorizing two types of DDoS attacks: “a powerful short term attack or persistent long
running campaign”.  Both the above types of popular DDoS attacks can be detected, prevented and mitigated using the proposed
novel Qualified Vector Match and Merge Algorithm (QVMMA) in real time. 14 feature components are used to generate an attack
signature in real time and stored in dynamically updated DDoS Captured Attack Pattern (DCAP)30database. It’s effective in
detecting new and old attacks. Persistent DDoS attacks cause financial damage or reputation loss by loss of the company’s valuable
clients. The server’s availability is heavily compromised. Popular websites Github and BBC UK faced DDoS attacks in 2015. Long
term DDoS attack directed on Github continued for over 118 hours34,35. Short term DDoS attack experienced by BBC36 website
caused its patchy response. The main crux of the problem is the absence of a way to differentiate between attack records and
legitimate records while the attack is occurring in real time. Several methods1-31,37-42 are listed in the paper. Post mortem solutions
are not applicable in real time. Available real time solutions are slow. QVMMA is an ideal faster real time solution to prevent
DDoS attacks using Statistical Feature Vector Generation. Matlab is used for DDoS real time simulation where the topologies (bus,
star, abilene network) are created using OMNET++33. QVMMA generates and uses Statistical Feature Vector for Attack Signature
Generation, Matching and Identification only for qualifier satisfied records. The web server’s log files used as input to QVMMA
are according to W3C log format standard34. Experimentation is completed with exhaustive 336 cases. Four networks are tested
with 5, 8, 10, 13 nodes. Performance evaluation of QVMMA concludes EER is 11.8% when threshold is 1.6. Abilene network
achieves best result. As the number of attackers, nodes and intermediate routers increase, detection time increases. If threshold is
increased, the accuracy reduces. If the number of nodes increases, accuracy increases. Thus it is concluded that QVMMA can be
used for effective layer 3 DDoS Prevention and Mitigation in real time based on results generated in Matlab simulation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) is an illegal online attack where the attacker uses a co-ordinated botnet or
an army of ‘zombies’ or infected computers to attack the victim server, for instance, by using a flooding of requests to
the victim server11,12. DDoS attacks are very difficult to detect because the actual attacker hides and conceals itself
behind the set of innocent ‘zombies’ who may be unaware that a large scale attack is being launched on the victim
server using them. These innocent ‘zombies’ are secondary victims but the primary main victim is the targeted server.
Feature vector can be effectively used to detect and identify DDoS attack records at different layers. The attack records
that are identified as harmful can be dropped for preventive mitigation of DDoS attack on victim. QVMMA algorithm
proposed and tested in this paper can be used to prevent DDoS attacks before they cause harm at the target victim
server. The different types of DDoS attacks based on layer and different anomalies used to detect DDoS is discussed
in section 2. This paper discusses the QVMMA algorithm for DDoS detection and mitigation. QVMMA is a novel
technique proposed in this paper with 14 feature components. Matlab simulation is used to test the proposed algorithm.
2. Literature Survey
Existing techniques and systems distinguished based on deployment location and basic concept1-30 used to detect
DDoS attacks are listed from patents and papers in Fig. 1. Proposed QVMMA can be implemented as a host based
solution and it can be extended to implement network based solution for better results. Statistical methods are simpler
and faster as compared to other available methods in literature survey.
Fig.1 : Different Traffic Anomaly detection methods available in literature1-30
There can be 3 types of DDoS attacks based on the layer in the TCP/IP networking stack the DDoS attack is directed
upon. They are : Layer 3, Layer 4 and Layer 7.They with their proposed solutions are listed as follows in Table 1.
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Next Section 3 discusses QVMMA approach in detail.
Table 1. Different Types of DDoS attack at 3 different layers.
Sr. No. Layer
Layer
Name
Possible forms of attack Proposed Solution Location of solution
1
Layer
3
attack
IP Layer
IP Flooding, UDP
Flooding
Qualified Vector Match and Merge
Algorithm for Binder Detection with
Protocol Type(PT) set as: PT=IP for
IP flooding and PT=UDP for UDP
flooding
This solution can be
located at the Edge
router away from the
victim. It can be host
based also.
2
Layer
4
attack
TCP Layer
TCP Syn Attack, TCP
ACK Attacks, Tear drop
attack(TCP Fragment-
Error in Fragmentation
Reassembly),Ping of
Death Attack, ICMP
Attack, Smurf Attack
Timer can be used to time and
remove TCP SYN, SYN+ACK, FIN
incomplete transactions before they
consume too much server resources.
Non essential Protocol Filtering for
Ping, ICMP and SMURF attack
This solution can be
located at the Edge
router away from the
victim
3
Layer
7
attack
Application
Layer
(HTTPS)
Continuous downloads of
objects from webpages at
small intervals by large
number of source ip
addresses
Feature Vector to measure the
resources consumed at the victim
server: No. of objects requested, No.
of times same object requested, Same
object inter request time
This solution has to be
located at the Victim
to measure the
resources consumed
by an attacker from a
victim server.
3. System Innovation: Algorithm QVMMA
QVMMA stands for Qualified Vector Match and Merge Algorithm that can be used for DDoS detection and
mitigation in real time.
3.1. Brief description
Brief description of steps of QVMMA for Binder Detection shown in Fig.2 is provided as follows:
1. Qualify: Qualify the Suspicious Records using Qualifiers Q={Q1,Q2} if it satisfies the given conditions.
Qualifiers are generated as first quartile value of Attack Signature Qualifier Components
2. Vectorization: Generate the vectors FV for suspicious records using Statistical Feature Vectors
3. Match: Match the vectors with the General Attack Vector(GAV). If it doesn’t match, then it is not an attack.
If fully or partially matched(based on Threshold T_GAV), determine its similarity score using Normalized
Absolute Distance(NAD) to find if it matches any store Attack Signature A1,A2……An . If it matches, then
it is an attack that has previously occurred and is captured in DCAP. If it doesn’t match, it is new pattern of
DDoS attack, it is updated in the DDoS Captured Attack Pattern database(DCAP) as new Attack Signature
An+1 .
4. Merge: Merge the feature vectors or signatures generated at Stage 2 Filter run at different routers inside the
network to measure the overall impact of attacker on the victim.
Fig.2: Stages in Qualified Vector Match and Merge Algorithm(QVMMA) for Binder Detection
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3.2. Detailed Description
The steps in Qualified Vector Match and Merge Algorithm (QVMMA) can be divided into 2 sequences. Sequence
1 is for training the DCAP database and sequence 2 is used to test the QVMMA algorithm on a new data set generated
in Matlab simulation to simulate real world networks.
Sequence 1 : Online Generate Attack Vectors from DDoS attacks to store and train DCAP database:
1. Run the Matlab simulation for DDoS attack to identify Attack Vectors or Attack signatures in real time.
Program randomly selects the source port address, data packet or payload size. Random number of virus
generated requests with random number of legitimate requests are generated by simulation.
2. Derive the feature components fc1, fc2, fc3……..fcn where n=14.
3. Create feature vector FV from above components: FV={fc1,fc2,fc3,fc4…………fcn}
4. Create feature vector characterizing each attacker (may differ for each tool): A1, A2,A3……..An.
5. Create General Attack Vector(GAV) which serves as a summary for DDoS attack and it is derived from the
above set of attackers
6. Store them in DCAP (DDoS Captured Attack Pattern) database.
Sequence 2: Online Deduplication steps based on Statistical Feature Vector Generation to test:
1. Store N records in a temporary file. N is determined based on the number of attacks detected in the previous
stage.
2. Start Stage 1 at victim server or it can be placed at edge router. Generate Qualifiers Q={Q1,Q2} for each flow
identified based on Source IP address and Destination IP address.
3. Use Qualifiers to qualify as suspicious records for those records which satisfy the Qualifier Condition QC
where [p  (1/H)].
4. Calculate feature components fc1,….., fcn where n=12 of suspicious flows .
5. Generate Feature Vector FV={fc1,fc2,……….fcn} for each suspicious flow.
6. Calculate the similarity measure E using Normalized Absolute Distance between the GAV and FV using
Eqn(1):
E=[(GAV)-(FV)]/FV (1)
7. If E > T_GAV, then it is an Attack. Else it is not an attack
8. If E > T_GAV, then determine the similarity measure S between FV and different attack signatures A1,…..An
stored in DCAP using formula in Eqn (2):
S = [(An)-(FV)]/ FV (2)
9. If Sn of FV matches Threshold T_S partially or completely, then the attacker is An.
10. Else FV is a new pattern of DDoS attacker from a new attacker.
11. Hence identify FV as An+1 and store it in updated DCAP.
12. Remove the duplicate requests from attackers and drop any other incoming requests from that ip address.
13. Next, use the source IP address from the above generated feature vector After second attempt of DDoS attack
from the same source IP address, then block that particular  ip address. It can be used to determine its binder
detection used to identify its previous history of attacks, if any.
14. Request for a Virus Scan.
15. Follow step 6 again.
3.3. System Description: QVMMA for Binder Detection Architecture
Detecting DDoS using QVMMA is assisted using Fig. 3. In Fig.3, the Rn represents the routers. The red arrow
indicates the attack requests with high volume of requests whereas the yellow arrow represents the attacks with  low
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volume. The QVMMA is capable of detecting high and low volume attacks using statistical feature vector components
generated in real time. The QVMMA solution is located in Bastion at the victim server. The server considered here is
a web server. Web logs designed as per W3C log format are used as an input to QVMMA algorithm.
Fig. 3: Architecture for QVMMA for Binder Detection
3.4. Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of QVMMA are:
1. It is designed to detect DDoS attack in real time
2. It can distinguish between flash crowd and DDoS attack
3. It is simpler and quicker than other methods stated in Section 2. It is possible to be implemented in real time.
4. It can detect dynamically new and old attack signatures which are consequently in DCAP database.
The disadvantage is:
1. The speed of the algorithm also depends on the speed of the processor used for Stage 1 QVMMA Control
Units as the volume of records to be processed will be very high in a small span of time in case of DDoS
attacks.
3.5. Feature Vector Set
The feature vector FV consists of 14 components. Out of 14 components, 2 components are used as qualifiers and
the rest components are calculated only if the qualifier condition is satisfied to generate attack signature.
3.5.1. Two Qualifiers
The qualifiers Q are :
1. Probability p=nsource_ip_address/Ntotal_records (3)
2. Entrophy H=(1/p)log10(1/p) (4)
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3.5.2. Twelve rest feature vector components
The rest of the feature components in feature vector for each suspicious record or attacker are :
1. Attacker name : a_name (5)
2. Attacker ip_address : a_ip (6)
3. no_of_attack_packets : nap= i=1:n a_ip (7)
4. total_size_of_packets_bytes : nb = n=1:nap Size_Bytes(a_ip) (8)
5. avg_size_of_packets_bytes : AvgB=(Total bytes/Total packets)a_ip = nb/nap (9)
6. Total duration of attack (secs) : Ta_ip=t1st_packet-tlast_packet (10)
7. Avg duration between each attack packet(secs) : Tavg_a_ip=Ta_ip/nap (11)
8. Total_size_of_packets_bytes_variance : Vb = [ n=1:nap(Size_Bytes(a_ip)-AvgB)2/nap]1/2 (12)
9. standard deviation : sd = (Vb)1/2 (13)
10. avg_size_of_packets_bytes_variance : AVB= Vb/nap (14)
11. ratio1 : r1 = AVB/ AvgB (15)
12. packet_rate_per_second : Pps=nap/Ta_ip (16)
3.6. Feature Vector Training Set and Test Data Set
Training data set and test data set for DDoS attack is created using simulation in Matlab. Training data set and test
data set for DDoS attack is created using simulation in Matlab. Sequence seq=1 is used for real time creation of
database of signatures from data set created using matlab simulation whereas sequence seq=2 is used to test the
algorithm on a new data set generated by the simulation created in Matlab. Thus there are 2 sequences :
1. Seq=1 for online training database for populating DCAP
2. Seq=2 for online testing the matching algorithm using above real time database
4. Experimental Evaluation Parameters and Settings
Networks, number of nodes, number of legitimate clients and attackers, thresholds are varied to test the algorithm.
Number of nodes considered are: 5,8,10,13. Number of victims is limited to 1 in this Matlab simulation. Topologies
considered shown in Fig.4 are: Bus, Star and Abilene network. grantThresholds gT ={1,2,3} are used.
4 simulated networks created in OMNET++ and tested in Matlab simulation are shown in Fig.4:
1. Straight Single Path Bus called Bus1 shown in figure 4(a)
2. Dual Path Bus called Bus2 shown in figure 4(b)
3. Star  Topology shown in figure 4(c)
4. Abilene Network shown in figure 4(d)
a b
c d
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Fig.4. Networks simulated in OMNET++ for testing with 13 nodes containing 12 clients and 1 victim server. (a)Straight bus ;(b) Bus 2 dual path
Network ;(c) Star Network ;(d) Abilene Network
All possible configurations tested are provided in Table 2. Codes provided are serial numbers from Table 2.
Table 2. Codes for configurations for testing QVMMA.
Calculation of Total number of test cases is denoted by T.
T =  Total number of configuration * Total number of networks * Total number of grant Thresholds (17)
T = (28) * 4 * 3 = 112 + 112 + 112 = 336 case
Performance Evaluation parameters used are listed with their formulas :
1. Detection Time[26](Sec) :
Detection Time = Total time required to detect the attack during Sequence2 (18)
1. Genuine Rejection Rate(GRR)[1](%) :
GRR = Number of attack packets identified  as attack packets/Total No. of attack packets (19)
2. Genuine Acceptance Rate(GAR) (%)[1]
GAR = Number of legitimate packets identified  as legitimate packets/Total No. of legitimate packets (20)
5. False Rejection Rate(FRR)(%) [1] :
FRR = Number of legitimate packets identified  as attack packets/Total No. of legitimate packets (21)
6. False Acceptance Rate(FAR )(%)[1] :
FAR = Number of attack packets identified  as legitimate packets//Total No. of attack packets (22)
7. Actual attack traffic passed rate A_ATPR(%) :
A_ATPR= total number of attack packets generated during Sequence 1 /Total no. of packets (23)
8. Actual non attack traffic or actual legitimate traffic packet rate (A_LTPR)(%):
A_LTPR = total number of non attack packets generated during Sequence 1 /Total no. of packets (24)
9. Experimental Attack Traffic Passed Rate (E_ATPR)(%) :
E_ATPR = total number of attack packets detected during algorithm execution  generated during Sequence
2  /Total no. of packets (25)
10. Experimental Legitimate Traffic Passed Rate (E_ATPR) (%):
E_LTPR = total number of non attack packets detected during algorithm execution generated during
Sequence 2 /Total no. of packets (26)
11. Deviation in attack traffic(Dev_ATPR)(%) :
Dev_ATPR  = A_ATPR - E_ATPR (27)
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12. Deviation in non attack traffic(%):
Dev_LTPR  = A_LTPR - E_LTPR (28)
13. Accuracy[2][3](%) :
Accuracy = Total number of packet identified correctly/Total number of packets (29)
14. Average of GAR and GRR (%) :
Average of GAR and GRR = (GAR + GRR)/2 (30)
5. Experimental Evaluation of Results of testing QVMMA on simulated networks in Matlab
The data structure used are files. Experimental evaluation is provided here for 332 cases. Table 3 shows sample
feature vector and table 5 shows fields with performance evaluation metrics for performance evaluation of QVMMA.
5.1. Feature Vector generated in Matlab
Sample feature vector values generated are provided in Table 3 along with a sample output in Matlab in figure 5.
Table 3. Sample feature vector generated in Matlab using QVMMA algorithm.
Fig. 5: Matlab simulation Output of QVMMA
5.2. Comparison of Average Performance Evaluation Results at gT={1,2,3}
Table 4.1 provides comparison of average performance evaluation results at gT={1,2,3}. The average accuracy of
gT={1} is 90.33%. The average  accuracy of gT={2} is 87.33%. The average  accuracy of gT={1} is 77.43%.
Fig. 6: EER graph at gT={1,2,3}
Table 4.1 : Comparison of Average of Performance
Evaluation Metrics at gT = {1,2,3}
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As per above Table 4.1, as the grant threshold gT is increased : following metrics increase across the three
thresholds : GAR, FAR , A_ATPR, E_ATPR , Dev_LTPR
Following metrics decrease across the three thresholds : Detection time,  GRR, FRR,  A_LTPR, E_LTPR , Accuracy,
Dev_ATPR and Average of GAR and GRR
Although GAR increases, but the overall accuracy of the system decreases if the threshold in increased. Following
Fig.6 is plotted using the above Table 4.1, the Equal Error Rate (EER) obtained is 11.8% at threshold of gT=1.6, that
is gT can be between 1 and 2.
The following Table 4.2 provides the comparison of all 4 networks based on accuracy, detection time and average of
GAR and GRR.
Table 4.3. : Comparison of Code with number of attackers
Thus according to above Table 4.2, minimum detection time taken by the Star network as it has minimum number
of intermediate routers between client and server which is 3. Followed by Abilene network and Bus2 Dual Path.
Maximum detection time taken is by the Single Straight Bus Path network as it has maximum number of intermediate
routers between client and server which is 13.
The average accuracy, detection time and average of gar and grr of all networks over all thresholds is 85.15 %,
1.46 seconds and 86.94% respectively.Following Fig.7 shows a radar chart to compare the 4 networks. Thus according
Fig. 7 : Comparison of 4 networks
TABLE 4.2: Comparison of all 4 networks
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to the above chart in figure 6, the highest accuracy and highest average of GAR and GRR belongs to Abilene networks,
being 86.14% and 86.94% respectively. Followed by Single Straight Path Bus and Star. The minimum accuracy and
minimum average of GAR and GRR belongs to Dual Bus Path networks.
Comparision of Code with number of attackers based on Accuracy , Detection Time and Average of GAR and
GRR is provided in Table 4.3.
Code 1 is the simplest configuration with 5 nodes containing 1 attacker, 1 victim and 3 legitimate clients. Code 28
is the most complex configuration with 13 nodes containing 11 attacker, 1 victim and 1 legitimate clients. The average
of all codes on Accuracy, Detection Time and Average of GAR and GRR 85.11%, 1.47 seconds and 86.82%
respectively.
Code 1 has maximum accuracy followed by Code 18 and Code 2 has minimum accuracy .Code 18  has maximum
Average of GAR and GRR and Code 17 has minimum Average of GAR and GRR, followed by Code 3 and 2. Code
28 has maximum detection time and Code 18 has minimum detection time.
Code 18 provides the best results out of all codes on the basis of its accuracy is 90.14%, detection time is 0.48
seconds and Average of GAR and GRR is 92.48%. Code 18 has 13 nodes with 1 attacker, 1 victim and 12 legitimate
clients. Other codes also provide acceptable performance. Table 4.4 provides Comparison of total number of nodes
based on Accuracy, Detection Time and Average of GAR and GRR.
Table 4.4: Comparison of Nodes based on Accuracy, Detection Time and Average of GAR,GRR
Maximum Accuracy and Average of GAR and GRR  and minimum Detection Time is obtained when number of
nodes is maximum at 13.  Minimum Accuracy and Average of GAR and GRR  and maximum Detection Time is
obtained when number of nodes is minimum at 5. Thus in general, as number of nodes increases (except node 10) ,
the accuracy and average of GAR and GRR increases whereas detection time increases as the number of node increases
as complexity increases with increase in number of attackers and legitimate clients.
6. Conclusion
Various configurations are tested as given with the results and discussion in the previous section with exhaustive
test cases. This solution is especially useful for layer 3 DDoS flooding type of attacks which is the most popular and
is easy to conduct on a website using a DDoS attack tool. Every DDoS attack tool will have its own attack signature
as will every client and attackers have. This can be used to identify from when and where a DDoS attack is being
conducted. It differentiates it with flash crowd and DDoS attack.
Filtering stage uses novel Qualified Vector Match and Merge Algorithm (QVMMA) model for statistical feature
vector generation. Qualifiers qualify and differentiate between the records that are normal or suspicious attack packets.
The Qualifiers Entropy and Probability save time and memory which otherwise may have been consumed to generate
feature vector for all records. The multiple features used for derived generation of statistical feature vector are source
ip address, source port address, destination ip address, destination port address, page requested and payload or data
size of packets, timestamp of packets received at server. These are in accordance with W3C log formats standard for
server logs. QVMMA is fast enough to be implemented in real time with the available ip records.
Other multiple features like time-to-live (ttl) can be used to generate  more feature vectors. These feature vectors
form attack signature which generated and stored in real time in an online real time database called DCAP. But use of
more and more feature vectors will increase time required for computation of signature, thus the number of feature
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vector components selected is a tradeoff between preferable maximum accuracy, minimum detection time, minimum
FAR, minimum FRR, maximum GAR, maximum GAR. Time taken to detect attack is a critical component in saving
the target victim server from any damage. Lesser the time taken to detect the DDoS attack, lesser is the probability of
damage caused by attack. This can be determined using experimentation. The main aim of ‘QVMMA for DDoS
Prevention/Protection and Mitigation Services’ is to prevent a DDoS attack while it is occurring in real time,
expanding from the mere post mortem analysis which is static. This simulation prototype created in Matlab
demonstrates dynamically creating an online real time database Distributed Capture Attack Pattern(DCAP)  while
attack is occurring in Sequence 1 for training the reference database of attack signatures. Sequence 2 tests the
signatures created dynamically in real time on a new set of records generated real time in Matlab. Performance
evaluation metrics, its results and discussion are provided.
More features can be added to identify different types of DDoS attacks. SYN flags, ACK flag could be incorporated
to detect SYN based DDoS attacks. Segment number could be included to detect tear drop DDoS attack which exploits
errors in fragmentation and reassembly in TCP/IP implementation. Multilevel non-essential protocol like ICMP, ping
filtering could be used to detect and prevent ‘Ping of Death’ attack and Smurf attack. Different features can be used
to detect and prevent different types of attack directed at different layer as listed in section 2 in Table 1.
This solution in this prototype exists at the server and this solution is controlled by the Bastion’s DDoS
Neutralization Service (DNS) at host. This solution could also be modified and used at the border router level to stop
the attack farther away from the victim. This solution as prototype provides acceptable performance. Further, more
feature vector components could be added to increase the accuracy of the prototype.
Performance evaluation of QVMMA algorithm concludes that EER is 11.8% when threshold is 1.6. Error is below
12 % when threshold used is 2 or less than 2 when tested in Matlab simulation. Abilene network achieves best results.
As the number of attackers and intermediate routers between the server and client increases, detection time increases.
As threshold is increased, the accuracy reduces. As number of nodes increases, accuracy and detection time increases.
Thus QVMMA can be used for effective DDoS Prevention and Mitigation in real time with a greater number of nodes
with any topology. QVMMA is fast enough to counter real time layer 3 flooding DDoS attacks in real time. Thus
QVMMA can be used to increase resilience against long term and short term DDoS attacks in real time.
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